We test whether firms use incompatibility strategically, using data from ATM markets.
Introduction
In recent years the economics of incompatibility have moved to the forefront of policy debates. The generic issue is something like this: Firm A produces two products, which may be more valuable when consumed together. Firm A faces competition in one or both markets. In principle, consumers can "mix and match" Firm A's products with those of its competitors, but Firm A decides to restrict consumers' ability to do so, effectively forcing them to buy both of its products together.
In computers, Microsoft is held to have used a variety of technical and contractual restriction to link products in this way. 1 In media and telecommunications markets, the prospect that owners of "bottleneck" facilities might use that advantage to acquire market power in other markets is an ongoing concern. 2 Kodak allegedly used contractual restrictions to deny users of its copiers the ability to use independent service and parts for repairs. 3 Printer manufacturer Lexmark was sued for restricting consumers' ability to use third-party toner cartridges in its printers. Terminology in these cases varies-some refer to incompatibility, others refer to access or interconnection pricing, and others term this behavior tying-but the economic question is the same in each case: when will a firm attempt to restrict access across related markets, and when will that strategic behavior be successful? See, e.g., Gilbert and Katz (2001) for a discussion. 2 The government's case against the AOL/Time Warner merger alleged that the merged entity could harm Internet Service Provider competition by denying competitors access to Time Warner's cable lines, and this issue dictated the terms of merger approval (which mandated that Time Warner provide open access to competing ISPs). In the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the concern that local exchange carriers could leverage their monopoly from switches to related markets drove the imposition of regulated access pricing. In this paper we provide an empirical framework for examining this question, using data from ATM markets. Banks offer both ATM cards and ATM services as a bundle to their depositors.
They also offer other banks' customers access to their ATMs, but impose a per-use surcharge for each such transaction. Surcharges are closest to the telecommunication example; they are an access fee for off-network transactions. The allegation (highlighted by the quote above) is that large banks use surcharges to create incompatibility between their ATMs and other banks' cards, degrading the value of their competitors' deposit accounts and creating competitive advantage in that market. 5 The particular difficulty in ATM markets is that bank might impose surcharges simply to maximize profits in their ATM business, considered as a stand-alone entity. This makes it hard to distinguish behavior intended to maximize profits within a market from behavior intended to maximize profits across markets. Do high ATM surcharges reflect an intent to create competitive advantage in the deposit account market? Or, do they merely reflect a profit-maximizing response to ATM demand? This is of particular concern in our setting; while there has been some empirical work establishing that surcharges are correlated with changes in deposit market outcomes, that work has not attempted to disentangle strategic behavior from other explanations (such as omitted variables affecting both markets). 6 More generally, while there is a substantial theoretical literature identifying the conditions under which incompatibility reflects a strategic motive, there has been little empirical work on the issue. 7 To distinguish surcharging that maximizes ATM profits from strategic incompatibility, we first estimate the firm-level surcharge that would maximize ATM profits without any regard to the deposit market. Our identification strategy benefits from a natural experiment. Prior to 1996 banks were largely barred from imposing surcharges; after the restriction was lifted, surcharging became widespread. 8 This regime change in surcharging allows us to estimate the elasticity of residual demand for foreign ATM transactions. With this in hand and information on marginal 5 Throughout the paper, our definition of 'large' matches that in the quote above: we measure bank size based on local (county) market share rather than national market share. This fits with the prevailing view that retail banking markets remain local. 6 Massoud, Saunders and Scholnick (2006) discuss this endogeneity issue, but do not estimate by how much strategic behavior distorts surcharges. Hannan et al. (2003) focus on the reduced form link between bank characteristics and surcharges without attempting to test whether surcharging is a form of strategic incompatibility. 7 Early theoretical work developing the economics of such markets includes that of Regibeau (1988, 1992) , Economides (1989) and Chou and Shy (1990) . Later work focusing on incompatibility includes Church and Gandal (1992 , 2000 , Economides and Salop (1992 cost, we can estimate the optimal stand-alone surcharge for each firm.
We then measure differences at the bank level between actual surcharges and our estimated optimal stand-alone surcharges: we call this difference the incompatibility premium. We find that large banks (those with high market share in their local markets) have much higher incompatibility premia than small banks (those with low market share i in their local markets); in fact, for small banks the average incompatibility premium is quite close to zero. This is consistent with the view that small firms have little motive or ability to restrict access for competitive advantage, but that large banks do have such a motive. We also estimate a model that can in principle reveal the parameters of interest to a bank: the partial derivatives of deposit account prices and quantities with respect to surcharging. In the models where we impose the most structure on the data, the parameters suggest that in our sample the strategic incompatibility motive stems from higher deposit fees, rather than increased quantity in the deposit account market.
Because the partial equilibrium incentives for incompatibility need not correlate with equilibrium outcomes in any systematic way, we also estimate the relationship between our estimate of the incompatibility premium and changes in deposit account prices, card account base and ATM deployment after surcharging. 9 In these empirical models, we condition on actual surcharges and measure the correlation between outcomes and the incompatibility premium. While in some cases we find correlations between actual surcharges and changes in outcomes, there is little evidence that strategic incompatibility has its intended effects. This result sheds light on some mixed empirical results from previous studies of ATM markets, which find that banks should use high surcharges strategically, and that large banks charge higher fees, but has found mixed evidence regarding the correlation between surcharging and deposit market outcomes. 10 9 Massoud, Saunders and Scholnick (2006) conduct a similar test that correlates surcharges with changes in deposit market outcomes; we condition on surcharges and estimate the correlation between changes and our estimated incompatibility premium. 10 Massoud, Saunders and Scholnick (2006) find a positive correlation between surcharges and gains in deposit share for large banks. Hannan et al. (2003) establish that large banks charge higher surcharges, using data from 1998, and also find that large banks are more likely to impose surcharges in markets with a high inflow of new customers-a result that they argue is consistent with the leveraging motive. But, they find little support for the notion that large banks are motivated by an attempt to steal existing customers from small banks. Prager (2001) finds no evidence that surcharges are correlated with deposit share losses by small banks, although her definition of "small" is based on national size and includes many banks with high local market share. Hannan (2005) does find evidence that large banks gain share in states with surcharges relative to a state that banned them, but is unable to undertake any cross-sectional analysis related to surcharging and the incompatibility motive because he does not observe actual surcharges.
The more structural work in Ishii (2005) and Knittel and Stango (2004) both find, using different data, that
To our knowledge, ours is the first empirical study to estimate the degree to which firm behavior is distorted by incentives for incompatibility. It is closely related to work by Genakos et al. (2004) , which estimates the incentive for incompatibility, but does not measure the equilibrium behavior generated by such an incentive. More generally, our work adds to the empirical literature on compatibility and competitive strategy. 11 
ATM Markets
Banks offer a variety of financial products, but we focus on two: ATMs and ATM cards. Together, the two allow electronic withdrawals from deposit accounts. Gandal [1994 Gandal [ , 1995 and Greenstein [1993] seeks to identify a first-order effect of compatibility on pricing and firm behavior. Later work has focused on a much 15 We take this figure from data in the Bank Network News, various years. it matches quite well with the 38% average figure in Massoud, Saunders and Scholnick (2006).
Prior to 1996, the major ATM shared networks (PLUS and Cirrus) prohibited ATM owners from imposing surcharges when non-customers used their machines. While some states had overridden this prohibition before 1996, most had not. In 1996, the networks rescinded the ban and surcharges became widespread. From 1997-1999, most banks adopted surcharges, and they are currently nearly universal. It is this regime change that provides the primary source of identification in the data;
as we show below, surcharging had first-order effects on consumer and firm behavior. It also led to allegations that surcharges were anti-competitive, based on the strategic incompatibility motive for large banks.
The Network Economics of ATMs and Fees
The underlying economics in ATM markets are intuitively similar to a variety of other markets.
ATMs and cards are a set of mix and match products: components that consumers use to construct a composite good-an ATM transaction. 16 Such composite goods are common; examples include audio/visual systems, computer systems and hardware/software systems more generally, and many others. 17 In these markets, it is often true that competing firms not only choose prices for their components, but also choose whether their components are compatible with those of their competitors. 18 Surcharging is a form of partial incompatibility; higher surcharges impose costs for using a card with an ATM owned by a different bank.
The motive for incompatibility in these markets is well-known. In ATM markets, the clearest exposition of this motive is found in Bernhardt (2002, 2003 18 How providers of complementary products set separate prices for their goods is not a relevant issue in our case, because own ATM access and deposit account services are bundled; there is a single price for both products.
highly dependent on market structure; incompatibility is typically unattractive when one or more of the component markets is perfectly competitive. Massoud and Bernhardt assume imperfect competition, but it is quite easy to see that in their model the incentive for leveraging disappears if the deposit account market is competitive. Second, Massoud and Bernhardt also find that large firms (i.e., those with greater market share) have greater incentives for incompatibility. This is also a common feature of other studies.
This result (and the intuition behind our empirics) is general to other settings. Economides, Lopomo and Woroch (1996) examine a very similar theoretical question, but in the context of telecommunications access. In telecommunications, the owner of a bottleneck facility (such as local switches) may charge an excessive price for access to that facility-excessive, in the sense that it is motivated by a desire to steal customers in a related market from competitors, and exceeds the stand-alone monopoly price for the bottleneck facility.
Theoretical Implications of Strategic Incompatibility
While there is substantial theoretical support for strategic incompatibility, there has been very little empirical work on the subject. Here we provide a framework that is directly applicable in any instance where firms might use interconnection degradation or access pricing as the mechanism for incompatibility. The intuition is closely related to the empirical framework independently developed by Genakos et al. (2004) for identifying strategic interoperability degradation. 19 Consider a bank offering both ATM services and ATM cards. Its profits in the two markets are
19 In both settings a firm with market power sells complementary products and faces competition. In their study, a PC OS monopolist reduces interoperability of the PC OS with competitors' server OSs. This reduces the attractiveness of the competitors' server OS product and increases profits. In our case, the ATM owner reduces the interoperability of its ATMs with competitors' cards, reducing the attractiveness of those cards and increasing profits. In both cases, a key empirical prediction is that market share and the leveraging motive are positively correlated.
Despite the similarity of the two studies there are both conceptual differences and differences in implementation.
First, the motive for reduced interoperability in Genakos et al. is foreclosure to achieve price discrimination. In our setting inducing exit is not a motive. Price discrimination is important, however; as Massoud and Bernhardt discuss, banks can engage in second degree price discrimination against their deposit account customers but not foreign ATM users. It is this that motivates stealing customers from other firms. A second conceptual difference is that Genakos et al. estimate an incentive for reducing interoperability, in partial equilibrium. They find that such an incentive exists and is large. Our approach examines the actual level of interoperability (because we observe a quantifiable metric of it), and estimates by how much interoperability is distorted by the leveraging motive.
where π A i represents profits from foreign ATM transactions and π C i are profits from ATM cards (deposit accounts). 20 The choice variable of interest is s i , the surcharge paid by non-customers using the bank's ATMs. In all of this analysis, we abstract away from the existence of foreign fees, to highlight the role of surcharges. We do account for them in the empirical work below.
While a surcharge does not directly affect deposit account demand and profits, a surcharge makes its competitors' deposit accounts less valuable to their customers, by increasing the expected fees that they pay. This may increase deposit account profits by making the surcharging bank's deposit accounts relatively more attractive. If the bank maximizes profits across the two markets, it will solve:
This will yield the profit-maximizing surcharge:
If we write profits in the two markets more completely as:
where s i is bank i's surcharge, k is the interchange fee (common across banks), c A is the marginal cost of an ATM transaction (also common across banks), Q A i is bank i's per-ATM demand for foreign transactions, A i is its number of ATMs, p C i is firm i's deposit account price, c C i is marginal cost of deposit accounts and Q C i is the number of depositors (ATM cards). The optimal surcharge is: 21
where
and
This decomposes the optimal surcharge into two parts. The first is s * i , the surcharge that maximizes profits in the ATM market, considered as a stand-alone business. This stand-alone surcharge is similar to (with some re-arranging) the familiar expression for the Lerner index describing the price-cost markup, where the "price" from surcharging is s i +k and marginal cost is c A . The second component Z * i is what we term the incompatibility premium; it is the difference between the actual surcharge and the stand-alone surcharge. If incompatibility increases deposit account demand the incompatibility premium will be positive, i.e. Z * i > 0 and s * * i > s * i .
Writing the expression this way illustrates the factors driving both stand-alone surcharging and strategic incompatibility. First, the stand-alone surcharge s * i is increasing in marginal cost, foreign transaction demand Q A i and the slope of residual demand for foreign ATM transactions, because strategic incompatibility involves deviating from stand-alone ATM profit maximization and doing so is more costly when a bank has many ATMs or foreign transaction demand is very sensitive to surcharges.
In the cross-section, it is likely that the incentives for strategic incompatibility vary. Because they have both more cards and more ATMs, banks that are large in their local markets will find incompatibility more attractive. It is also likely that the ability to siphon deposit share
stronger for large banks (this is elucidated by Massoud and Bernhardt [2002] ). In the empirical work below, we examine these cross-sectional effects by splitting the sample by size; we denote as large any bank with a deposit market share in its local markets above the sample median, and as small any bank with a share below the sample median.
Empirical Tests for Strategic Incompatibility
Here we outline a series of empirical tests that can in principle reveal both the partial equilibrium (private) incentives for incompatibility, and can also shed light on the equilibrium effects of such behavior when there are many firms in the market. We first estimate the optimal stand-alone surcharge at the firm level,ŝ * it ; by the identity Z * i ≡ s * * i − s * i , this also estimates the incompatibility premium Z * i . Our simplest test of whether surcharging reflects a strategic motive is to compare actual surcharges to estimated optimal stand-alone surcharges; if they are equal, this implies that Z * i = 0. We also ask whether large banks-who may find strategic incompatibility more worthwhile-have higher estimates of Z * i than smaller banks.
Our second test imposes more structure on the data, by fitting the first-order condition described in equations 6-8. If surcharges merely reflect stand-alone profit maximization then equation (7) should be well-specified. Another way of putting this is that a bank with no strategic motive for surcharges will set s * * i = s * i , meaning that in the cross-section the coefficient in a regression of actual on estimated stand-alone surcharges should be one. If on the other hand actual surcharges reflect a strategic motive, then a model containing the additional term in equation (8) should fit the data better. We can also use this model to uncover some parameters of interest-the partial derivatives of profit with respect to surcharges. 22 Again, we estimate this model for both large and small banks.
Finally, we use data from the three years following surcharging's inception to examine the equilibrium effects of both surcharging and strategic incompatibility in deposit markets. These tests are motivated by the fact that while firms may have private incentives for incompatibility, the oligopoly equilibrium effects of such behavior are ambiguous. 23 We examine how incompatibility is correlated with three outcomes: ATM cards (deposit accounts), average deposit account fees and ATM deployment. We examine how changes in the variables over the period following surcharging are correlated with the levels of both surcharges and the incompatibility premium. 22 Technically we can only estimate the interaction between (unobserved) deposit price-cost margins and the partial derivative of depositors with respect to surcharges,
. 23 In many models where firms choose compatibility but are symmetric, a prisoners dilemma-type effect occurs where all firms choose "too much" incompatibility, but it has no equilibrium effects on market shares (though welfare and prices may change). This occurs in Massoud and Bernhardt (2002) when banks are symmetric.
Empirical Analysis

Data and Descriptive Statistics
We take our data from the Card Industry Directory, an annual publication listing data for the largest ATM card issuers in the United States. The Card Industry Directory contains information on total ATM cards, total ATMs owned and ATM fees (surcharge and foreign). It also contains the total number of transactions on the bank's ATMs. We cross-reference these data with the FDIC Reports of Condition and Income (or "Call Reports"), and the FDIC Summary of Deposits data.
These other sources provide us with bank-level information about local markets. Most important, we observe both a bank's deposit share (across all of its local markets if it operates in more than one) and the population density of the markets that the bank serves. 24 Market share is important because in much of our analysis we compare the behavior of banks with high market share to that of banks with low market share-the idea being that large banks should have a stronger incentive for incompatibility. 25 Population density is also important because ATM use involves travel and travel costs may be higher in dense markets; in related work, we have found that population density is strongly correlated with cross-market differences in ATM and deposit account pricing. 26 A further advantage of the cross-indexed data is that it allows us to estimate the foreign fees and surcharges charged by a bank's competitors in its local markets. We do this by exploiting the fact that bank size is strongly correlated with both surcharging and foreign fees (as we illustrate in Table 1 below). Thus, the size distribution of a bank's local competitors is a good proxy for the fees charged by those competitors. 27 As it turns out, this is not critical for our analysis, as we are primarily interested in how a bank's own surcharges affect its own transaction demand.
Further, there is not much scope for mis-measuring within-bank variation in competitors' fees over time, because foreign fees do not change much at all in our sample, and variation in competitors' surcharging is almost exclusively a 0/1 transition before and after 1996. Nonetheless this measure 24 Market share is calculated as the deposit-weighted market share across all markets. If a bank has 20% of its deposits in a market where its share is 30%, and 80% of its deposits in a market where its share is 10%, the weighted average market share is (0.20)(0.30)+(0.80)(0.10)=0.14, or 14%. 25 Ideally, we could exploit cross-sectional variation in relative deposit and ATM shares, but ATM and deposit shares are too highly correlated for this to be a useful exercise. In order to clarify some of the cross-sectional differences across card issuers, we classify banks as being "large" if they have a deposit share in their local markets that is above the sample median, and "small" otherwise. 29 Large banks impose higher surcharges and foreign fees than smaller banks.
The former is consistent with strategic incompatibility, but could also reflect a systematic difference in the elasticity of residual demand for foreign transactions; it will be important to control for this possibility in the empirical work. The latter may reflect differential price discrimination, although this is difficult to establish with certainty. 30 While surcharges change dramatically over the sample period, foreign fees rise only slightly (at roughly the inflation rate). Large banks begin the sample with a higher average level of transactions per ATM, but this relationship reverses by the end of the sample. Large banks appear to be more aggressive in deploying ATMs when measured relative to cards; the ratio of cards per ATM is lower for large banks and falls for large banks, while remaining stable for small banks.
We present the data stratified in this way to illustrate two points. First, there are significant cross-sectional differences in the degree to which banks impose surcharges. These are largely consistent with theory; large banks impose higher surcharges. However, this should not be viewed as conclusive evidence of the strategic behavior that interests us, as cross-sectional differences in pricing could stem from cross-sectional variation in the elasticity of residual demand. A second point regarding these data is that they illustrate the first-order effects of surcharges on consumer and firm behavior; per-ATM transactions fell by 30% after the advent of surcharges. 31 This provides a useful identifying source of variation in the data. 28 As we discuss in Knittel and Stango (2004) , our results are robust to a number of alternative imputation methods.
Moreover, our estimates of the key parameter here (the slope of residual demand for a bank's own ATM transactions, with respect to its own surcharge) are identical whether we include estimated competitors' fees or just condition only on fees that we observe with certainty (i.e., a bank's own surcharge and foreign fee). 29 In our data, "large" banks are those with a local market share greater than thirteen percent. We have also estimated bank's local ATM shares and classified them based on that variable; the two are nearly perfectly correlated, so the results do not depend much on which measure we use. 30 We do not observe the bank-level menu of checking fees-some of these exhibit nonlinear pricing of foreign transactions. It is not uncommon for banks to give five free foreign transactions per month on certain checking accounts.
In any event, as we noted above, our residual demand analysis uses within-firm changes in fees for identification;
foreign fees do not change much at the firm level in our data. 31 Some of this change is the result of greater ATM deployment; we control for this in the empirical work below.
Estimating Residual Demand and Stand-Alone Surcharges
Beginning with Equation (7) above, if the residual demand for foreign transactions is linear, we can rewrite the expression for the optimal stand-alone surcharge as:
The partial derivative
is the slope of residual demand for foreign ATM transactions with respect to surcharges. With data on ATM fees and transactions, it is possible to estimate the slope of residual demand γ i in the vein of Baker and Bresnahan (1988) . Their approach specifies a relationship between quantity demanded, own prices, competitors' prices, and controls. 32 In our case, we estimate the demand for foreign ATM transactions with respect to surcharges using the following specification:
where AT M T rans it is the (monthly) number of transactions per ATM and F orCost it is the foreign ATM cost for bank i's ATMs (the own price). 33 Because we focus on what drives cross-sectional variation in surcharges-in particular, whether high fees for large banks reflect strategic behaviorwe allow the slope of the residual demand to vary by firms size. 34 This allows us to identify whether the cross-sectional variation in surcharges is driven by differences in residual demand or differences in the level of strategic incompatibility. We also allow the slope of residual demand to vary based on the population density quintile of a bank's local market(s). The estimated slope of residual demand b γ i for a given bank will then depend not only on the first term γ 1 but on the parameter 32 Baker and Bresnahan use a double-log specification, which yields elasticities directly. We can not employ this specification because sit = 0 for the years prior to surcharging. 33 F orCost is the bank's own surcharge plus our estimate of its competitors' foreign fees. We have also use specifications with only the surcharge; the results are nearly identical. 34 We are agnostic about the direction of such a difference. We might expect that the least price-sensitive customers would sort into large banks, to avoid paying surcharges. This would increase the elasticity of foreign transaction demand for large banks, because a large bank's foreign transactions would be made by the price-sensitive customers of small banks and vice versa. On the other hand, we remain open to the possibility that large banks face less elastic demand-perhaps because they deploy their ATMs in superior locations. Although the dependent variable AT M T rans it is bank i's total ATM transactions rather than its foreign transactions, the parameter γ i should estimate
because usage of bank i's ATMs by its own customers should be invariant to its surcharge (which is never paid by its own customers). 36 The other variables are intended to control for other factors influencing transactions. F orCost −i,t is the foreign ATM cost on other ATMs in bank i's local markets (the cross-price). CardsperAT M it is the bank's total number of ATM cards divided by its total transactions; all else equal, a bank with more cards per ATM will have more transactions per ATM (we do allow for the endogeneity of this variable). We also include the bank's total number of ATMs to control for any within-firm changes in total ATM deployment and the effects of such deployment on transaction volume. The variable Surch96 it measures the share of bank i's deposits in states that allow surcharging before 1997. 37 The specification includes both fixed firm effects, μ i , and fixed year effects, η t .
The primary econometric issue in these models is that F orCost it and CardsperAT M it should be treated as endogenous, as will any variable interacted with one of these. 38 It is likely that there is a component of ATM demand that is observed by the firm, but unobserved to the econometrician.
Because the firm observes this, its equilibrium surcharges may be affected, as might its card and ATM supply decisions. The fixed bank and year effects included in the residual demand equation will absorb unobserved demand components that are constant within firm, as well as general changes in the demand for ATM transactions across years. A good instrument therefore will be correlated with cross-sectional differences in how surcharges and ATM deployment changed within firms over time, but uncorrelated with the unobserved component of demand.
With this in mind, we interact a number of variables reflecting cross-sectional differences in organizational structure and market conditions with a set of year effects. In particular, we include a dummy variable equal to one if the bank is a holding company that owns multiple subsidiaries (this is essentially a size instrument), the share of the bank's branches in Metropolitan Statistical 35 We have also allowed the slope to vary by population density tertile or quartile rather than quintile. We have also used finer size categories. 36 More precisely, we can write total demand as the sum of demand by own and foreign customers: . 37 Ideally, we would measure whether the bank actually surcharged prior to 1997, but those data are not available.
But to the extent that banks do surcharge in other states, transaction volume will be affected. 38 We have also treated ln(ATMs) as endogenous. This increases all of the estimated standard errors in the model but does not change the point estimate on the slope of residual demand.
Areas (MSAs) and population density in the bank's local markets. 39 Because the surcharge ban constrained the degree of cross-sectional variation in F orCost it the interaction of these variables with year effects will capture changes in the cross-sectional differences in how a given firm's surcharge behavior changed over time. For these to be valid instruments, we need that the relationship between the demand for ATM transactions and these other variables is stable over our sample.
We have experimented with different sets of instruments with little effect on the results; this is not surprising, as the primary source of identification is the transition from no surcharges to surcharges; this is explained almost completely at the bank level by year dummies and year/bank holding company interactions. Table 2 shows results from our residual demand regressions. The first column shows results of a simple OLS specification that includes only the own price variable F orCost it and the price interactions. The second shows IV estimates of the same specification-as expected, the price coefficient becomes more negative. Model 3 includes competitors' foreign cost, cards per ATM and ln (AT M s). Model 4 restricts the sample to include only those banks that impose surcharges at some point during the sample period. 40 We also present in Model 5 a specification that includes the variable Surch96 it measuring the bank's pre-1997 presence in states that permit surcharging.
Residual Demand Slope and Elasticity
In every specification, the estimated coefficient on F orCost it is negative and statistically significant. The large bank interaction is negative, suggesting that banks with higher market share may face more elastic demand for ATMs. While the population density interaction terms are only statistically significant for the densest quintile, the pattern of coefficients suggests that demand is less elastic in dense areas; this accords with the general pattern of results we have found in previous work. 41 Cards per ATM are positively correlated with transactions per ATM. The cross-price coefficient is positive, and significant in the last column, as theory would predict. ATMs are not 39 These variables are all statistically significant in cross-sectional regressions with either surcharges or cards per ATM as the dependent variable. 40 It is somewhat puzzling that some banks do not surcharge, particularly when our model predicts that surcharging at some level is optimal for nearly all banks. There may be other reasons for such behavior. Many banks, for example, seem to use low ATM fees as a marketing device to signal generally low fees.
Below, we discuss all of our results both for the entire sample, and for the subsample of banks that impose surcharges. 41 Knittel and Stango (2004) find a systematic relationship between deposit prices, ATMs and surcharges in highdensity markets but no such relationship in low-density markets.
significant in any specification. The Surch96 it coefficient is negative and significant, as expected;
its inclusion also makes the point estimate on F orCost it more negative.
Reading from the third column, we estimate an economically significant effect of fees on transaction demand. We estimate that a one dollar increase in fees reduces foreign transactions per machine by roughly 1000 per month. The 1000 transaction point estimate is quite large relative to the typical number of foreign transactions per machine, which averages 2000 in our sample. 42
Using this coefficient estimate and those on the interaction terms, we construct our estimate of the firm-level slope of residual demand b γ i . In this calculation, we use surcharge and quantity data from 1999, the last year in the sample; this allows for the possibility that there was a gradual adjustment to the surcharging equilibrium over the period 1997-1999. We then use b γ i to estimate the optimal stand-alone surcharges at the firm level using the formula in Equation (9). Doing so requires information on interchange fees and marginal cost, and also requires an estimate of the share of total ATM transactions that are foreign. For k and c A , we use values of $0.40 and $0.10. The $0.40 figure is the median value of the interchange fee across networks. 43 While we do not observe marginal cost directly, it is quite low, involving only the incremental cost of switching the transaction over the network; an estimate of $0.10 is probably on the high side. In any event, both interchange and marginal cost are virtually identical across issuers, meaning that they do not affect any of our cross-sectional comparisons below. We assign each bank a share of foreign transactions equal to the national sample average of twenty-five percent in 1999. If anything, this assumption causes us to over-estimateŝ * it for large banks and under-estimateŝ * it for small banks (pushing against the strategic incompatibility story), as evidence from later in the sample period suggests that large banks have fewer foreign transactions as a share of their transactions per ATM. 44 Table 3 shows summary statistics for our estimates of the residual demand slope b γ i , standalone surchargesŝ * it and incompatibility premiaẐ * i = s i −ŝ * i , again using quantity and surcharge information from 1999. 45 We show results for the entire sample as well as the subsample of banks who surcharge. We also stratify the results by our large/small bank category. Large banks face more 42 While we do not know the bank-level breakdown of transactions per machine (own vs. foreign), we can infer aggregate averages from data on how many transactions are switched by networks each month.
43 This figure comes from reported interchange fees in Bank Network News. There is no evidence that large banks pay interchange fees that are systematically higher or lower than those paid by small banks. 44 The Card Industry Directory does not begin reporting bank-level information on foreign vs. own ATM transactions until 2001. In that year, the average share of foreign transactions for large banks is 20%; for small banks it is 30%. (Both figures are presumably lower than they were in 1999). 45 One issue we do not treat in this analysis is the fact that most surcharges are increments of $0.25, with modes at $1.00 and $1.50. An alternative approach to the one we take here would account for such discreteness, but we do not have a good model that explains why surcharges are priced this way. However, as long as bank size is not correlated elastic demand and have fewer transactions per ATM; both of these pushŝ * i down relative to small banks. 46 Large banks also impose higher surcharges. In concert, this leads to estimates of Z * i that are substantially higher, on average, for large banks. The results suggest that large banks impose surcharges $0.28 higher than they would absent a strategic motive, while small banks undercharge by $0.52 relative to the optimum. Much of the latter negative effect comes from the fact that we include banks with no surcharge in the average; when we drop them, large banks have an average premium of $0.66, while small banks have an average close to zero ($-0.02). We are somewhat circumspect about interpreting the level of these estimates, which depend on our assumptions about k and c A ; however, the cross-sectional pattern that large banks have higher estimates ofẐ * i is independent of these assumptions, and quite robust to changes in the specifications we use to obtain b γ i . Thus, the patterns we find are consistent with the simplest prediction of the model; we find evidence that actual surcharges exceed stand-alone surcharges, and this difference is positively correlated with market share.
Fitting the First-Order Condition
An approach that imposes slightly more structure on the data is to fit the first-order conditions in equations 6-8 and ask whether pricing is more consistent with stand-alone profit maximization or the richer condition that incorporates a strategic motive. Beginning with equations 6-8 and adding a random component, we can rewrite the equation for the optimal surcharge as: 47
with some unobserved heterogeneity in how banks choose discrete prices our cross-sectional results will still hold. 46 Although they are not of primary interest, we have calculated the corresponding demand elasticities in our sample.
Note that there are actually two such elasticities, because prices paid by consumers (F orCost it ) do not correspond to prices received by banks (si + k). We call the former the "consumer demand elasticity" and the latter the "firm demand elasticity." For large (small) banks in 1999, the consumer demand elasticity averages 2.9 (2.0) and the firm demand elasticity averages 1.9 (1.2).
47 While theory suggests a coefficient restriction (β 1 = 1), we relax the restriction here.
The empirical question is whether this richer model fits the data better than the simple model in which s * * it =ŝ * it , which is equivalent to testing whether β 2 = β 3 = 0. 48 We estimate these models using least squares and test the restrictions. We also estimate the model separately for the subsamples of large and small banks, and in some specifications only for the subsample of banks that surcharge. Table 4 shows results from this model. As the second through fifth columns show, for large banks the estimate of β 2 is positive and statistically significant. For small banks (columns 6-9) β 2 is not significantly different from zero. Comparing the significance of β 2 and β 3 can in principle identify the motive for strategic incompatibility, which may come from either higher deposit account . Our results suggest that it is the former effect that motivates pricing here. We are somewhat cautious about making a definitive interpretation of the result, because β 2 and β 3 are identified from a restriction on functional form.
Equilibrium Changes in Market Outcomes
All of the analysis to this point focuses on partial equilibrium incentives for incompatibility, and how they distort pricing relative to stand-alone ATM operations. But because banks compete with each other, the equilibrium effects of incompatibility in the deposit account market are unclear.
Because we lack the data to estimate a fully specified model of equilibrium changes in deposit account prices and quantities, we estimate three simpler reduced form models: ln(Q We have also estimated models that attempt to include deposit account fees as a proxy for price-cost margins.
The coefficient on the price variable is not significant.
The dependent variables measure changes from 1996-1999 in ATM cards, deposit account fees and ATMs, and correlate these changes with our variables of interest. We measure changes in cards as a log-difference, and changes in deposit fees as the level change in dollars of revenue per $1000 of deposit balances per year. 49 We also include the bank's levels of cards, fees and ATMs in 1996, along with its population density quintile.
These models estimate the correlation between our estimate of the incompatibility premium Z i and changes in deposit account quantity (cards) or price. The central econometric concern is spurious correlation betweenẐ i and these changes. IfẐ i were completely mis-measured we would see a zero coefficient on the variable. Suppose, however, that some banks have high unobserved quality (on ATMs and other dimensions). This would be reflected in both a high surcharge and increases in deposit account price and quantity, and possibly an increase in ATM deployment. To control for this possibility, we also include the actual surcharge. The exercise therefore compares changes in ATMs and deposit market variables, holding actual surcharges constant-that is, of two banks with surcharges of $1.50, one of which we identify as engaging in strategic incompatibility and one of which we do not, which experiences the greater increases in ATMs, deposit price and quantity?
We do not report the results of these models, in large part because we find essentially no significant relationship between incompatibility premia and the outcomes. This holds even when we examine subsamples by: large and small banks that surcharge, banks with an estimatedẐ i above and below the median (conditional on surcharging) and banks that do not surcharge. 50 The one exception is for ATM deployment; we find no systematic relationship between actual surcharges and changes in ATM deployment, but a coefficient onẐ i of 0.38 for large banks, significant at the 49 This measure includes direct revenue from checking account fees as well as foreign ATM fees. It does not include checking account interest or the implicit return from the opportunity cost of funds. Using a broader metric of price including one or both of these measures yields nearly identical results. 50 One might wonder why we observe any banks without surcharges, given our estimates of the slope of residual demand. While our results suggest that banks without surcharges have lower-than-average optimal surcharges, very few have estimated optimal surcharges that are zero.
One explanation for this is that banks do receive revenue from foreign transactions through the interchange fee, even when surcharges are zero. We may be underestimating the slope of residual demand at very low prices (it is estimated at higher prices).
Another possible explanation is that at least some banks apparently use a "no-surcharge" pricing policy as a signal that they generally have low fees (since surcharges are a more visible component of fees). One notable example of this is Washington Mutual, which features the fact that it does not surcharge prominently in its checking account marketing (despite the fact that its prospective checking account customers should find other banks' deposit accounts more attractive).
5 percent level. The coefficient for small banks is 0.27 but not statistically significant.
Conclusion
Identifying situations in which firms use incompatibility strategically is critical for developing sound antitrust and public policy toward compatibility. Here, we present a simple economic framework for analyzing whether a particular form of incompatibility-an access charge for off-network transactions-is intended to shift competitive advantage in a related market. Our results are consistent with such behavior in ATM markets, but only for large banks.
We see a few directions for future work in the area. First, our analysis largely abstracts from the dynamic issues inherent in compatibility choice. In almost any market with network effects there are strong intertemporal demand links, both because of network effects and often because of switching costs. Incorporating these features into an empirical model would improve it. A second limitation is that here we pursue a reduced form approach to many of the questions we raise (such as estimating equilibrium effects of incompatibility). Our small sample dictates this approach, but with more data one could certainly place more structure on the model. Genakos et al. (2004) is an example of one way to do this. Notes: All data are from 1999. "Slope of demand" is the average across all banks of the estimated slope of residual demandγ i , using the coefficients in model (4) of Table 2 . "Estimated stand-alone surcharge" is calculated asŝ * i = −k + c A − 
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